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Labour Market Deregulation and Gender Wage Equity: 





It is widely predicted labour market deregulation will adversely impact on 
female earnings. The evidence for Australia has, so far, been mixed. 
Content analysis of agreements suggests that equal employment 
opportunities are been compromised, but aggregate wage data shows 
that this has had no discernible effect on the gender wage gap. In this 
paper we focus specifically on Western Australia and show that where 
radical industrial relations reforms have been introduced, gender wage 
equity has, indeed, been compromised.  Western Australia 'leads the way' 
in industrial relations reforms. Many reforms recently proposed at the 
federal level have already been implemented in Western Australia. The 
latter thus provides a window on future developments with respect to 
gender wage equality ... and the outlook is not good. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In recent years the productivity performance of the Australian economy has been 
extraordinary. Over the latest cycle (1993/94 to 1997/98) productivity growth has increased at 
an average rate of 2.4% per year.  This compares to average annual growth rates of 0.8%  to 
1.6% in previous cycles.  The current cycle, therefore, breaks with the past and evidence is 
mounting to show that it is not a short-run phenomenon. That is, the economy looks set to 
continue on this new growth trajectory (Parham, 1999). The factors driving these higher rates 
are now a subject of much interest and debate.  The Commonwealth Treasury attributes the 
current performance to sound macroeconomic policy and microeconomic reforms aimed at 
increasing the responsiveness and flexibility of the economy (CofA, 1999). 
 
In the labour market, the drive to increase flexibility commenced in the mid 1980s with the 
implementation of two-tiered wage bargaining, where second tier increases were linked to 
trade-offs, such as award restructuring and multi-skilling (Macklin, et al, 1993). In 1991 this 
new policy direction stepped up a gear with the introduction of enterprise bargaining. 
Subsequent industrial relations legislative amendments have focussed on promoting enterprise 
bargaining and labour market deregulation as key components of the workplace 
reform/workplace productivity policy. Recent ('second wave') reforms proposed by the Federal 
Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, the Hon. Peter Reith, and 
now before the Commonwealth Parliament in the form of the Workplace Relations Legislation 
Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999, aim to further curb union power and "... 
encourage the use of agreements ... to achieve improved productivity and competitiveness ..." 
(Reith, 1999).  
 
Aside from presupposing that there is a link between industrial relations reform and workplace 
productivity (Rimmer (1998) and  Hawke and Drago (1998) show that enterprise bargaining of 
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itself has no discernible effect on workplace performance) the policy challenges established 
normative principles, such as the right to equal pay. International literature on female pay 
points to an inverse relationship between the degree of centralisation and the gender pay gap 
(Rubbery, 1992).  The groups most threatened by labour market deregulation are those with 
the poorest bargaining power, typically those in low status occupations, part-time and casual 
work and those not unionised - with women being disproportionately represented in these 
groups (Robertson, 1992; Burgmann, 1994; and Sayers, 1998). 
 
Thus far the evidence as to the effect of labour market deregulation on Australian gender wage 
inequality has been mixed.  Content analysis of agreements generally shows that equal 
employment opportunity provisions have been weakened and that the beneficiaries of the new 
arrangements are managers rather than workers (e.g. Boreham, Hall, Harley and Whitehouse, 
1997).  At an aggregate level, however, these changes have not adversely impacted on 
gender earnings. Although there has been a slight deterioration in female/male relative 
earnings since the reforms were first introduced, the change has not been statistically 
significant (Wooden, 1997). 
 
In this paper we offer new insight into the effects of labour market deregulation on gender 
earnings inequality in Australia.  Our focus of analysis is Western Australia, a state which has 
"... led the way in Australia through labour relations reforms" (WA 2000).  At August 1991 there 
was a 17.5 per cent gap in the earnings of Western Australian males and females. By August 
1998 this gap had grown to 23 per cent.1 The rate of deterioration of gender pay equality in 
Western Australia in this period outstripped that of all other states and territories in Australia.  
Our analysis in this paper shows that the widening gender earnings gap had more to do with 
institutional transformations than adverse shifts in human capital endowments (as posited by 
neo-classical wage theory). 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II offers a brief comment on the Western Australian 
industrial relations arrangements;  Section III discusses reasons why the gender wage gap 
may change over time; Section IV discusses the data and methodology; Section V presents 
the results; and Section VI offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II Western Australia 
 
In Western Australia the main act governing industrial relations matters has been the Industrial 
Relations Act 1979 (WA). Developments at the State level have largely mirrored those at the 
Federal level, although since 1991 departures are evident. Under Section 51(2) of the act, the 
WA Industrial Relations Commission is required to convene a hearing to give consideration to 
the national wage case (NWC) decisions of the Federal industrial tribunal.  The provisions of 
Section 51 are still valid, but the introduction of alternative bargaining arrangements in 
Western Australia has affected the coverage of awards, and thus the degree of flow on of 
Federal decisions. 
 
The principal legislative changes which have occurred since 1991 include the introduction of 
the Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA) and the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 
1993 (WA).  The Workplace Agreements Act received Royal Assent on 23 November 1993 
                                                           
1  The decline was significant (t=2.79). 
4
and came into effect on 1 December 1993. The clear intention of the Workplace Agreements 
Act  is the promotion of direct bargaining (i.e. as between the employer and employee direct, 
without third party involvement). (For more details on the Workplace Agreements Act see Ford, 
1996). 
 
Since the introduction of the Workplace Agreements Act (or 'First Wave' of industrial reform), 
there have been a number of legislative amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1979 
(WA), commonly known as Second' and 'Third' waves.  The proposed Second Wave reforms 
met with weeks of industrial unrest, culminating in a withdrawal of the bill and a watering down 
of the planned reforms.  The Third Wave also met with similar levels of conflict, although not as 
efficacious (Bailey and McAtee, 1999). The principal aim of the latter (Third Wave) was 
curtailment of union activity (Bailey and Horstman, 1999).  
Underpinning the Workplace Agreements Act is the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act.  
This act covers minimums with respect to rates of pay, leave conditions, conditions for 
employment changes and record keeping requirements. According to Keirath, it is designed to 
establish a:  
 
"... safety net of core minimum conditions which will extend to and bind all employees and 
employers and will be taken to be implied in any contract of employment including those 
governed by a workplace agreement, an award or industrial agreement ... It is a 
pacesetter in Australia and precedes the Federal legislation, foreshadowed by the 
Federal Minister for Industrial Relations, which will lay down certain minimum conditions 
of employment ..." 
(Second Reading Speech, Assembly, 8/7/93, pp.1456-1459.) 
 
The minimum wage, as covered by the act, is set by the state Minister for industrial relations, 
usually based on the recommendations of the WA Industrial Relations Commission (although 
there is no requirement that that be the case).  Penalty rates, allowances and loadings do not 
form part of the minimum weekly rates prescribed.  
 
The minimum wage applies to employees aged 21 or more.  Employees who are under 21 
years of age are subject to different (lower) minimum rates.  Part-time employees have pro-
rata access to the minimum wage provisions.  Unless otherwise stated by the Minister, the 
divisor is 40 (representing a 40 hour week).  Casual employees (defined as persons not 
entitled to paid leave) are entitled to a loading of 15 per cent. Disabled persons may agree in 
writing to a wage lower than the set minimum wage. 
 
Protagonists of the act argue that its minimums are meagre.  The 15 per cent casual loading 
is, for example, 5 percentage points lower than the 20 per cent rate contained in most awards.  
The minimum wage is also lower than the minimum wages of most awards and the minimum 
wage in the Federal jurisdiction.  When the act first came into effect the minimum wage was 
set at $275.5 per week. Shop assistants employed under the Shop and Warehouse 
(Wholesale and Retail Establishments) State Award 1977 were, at that time, entitled to a 
minimum of $385 per week.  The fear is that via the act workers on higher award wage 
minimums will find themselves party to an individual agreement where the minimum wage is 
lower (Assembly, pp.3021.3022).2 
                                                           
2  Legally there is nothing to stop individuals trading away their higher award wage minimums via a 
workplace agreement (so long as the new wage is not lower than that prescribed by the Minimum Conditions of 
Employment Act 1993.  However, as part of the ratification process, the Commissioner of Workplace Agreements 
must ensure that: the agreement complies with the act; each party appears to understand his or her rights and 
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The protagonists also point out that the act has a number of significant omissions. Penalty 
rates, overtime rates and annual leave loading, for example, are not mentioned in the act. By 
implication these benefits may be negotiated away.3 
 
 
III Why Might the Wage Gap Change? 
 
There are a number of reasons why the gender wage gap may change over time. Broadly they 
may be classified as 'productivity' (fair) effects or 'wage structure' (unfair) effects.4  Human 
capital theory offers an explanation of why the former would cause the gap to change, but is 
unable to account for the latter. Wage structure effects are, instead, better explained by 
institutional factors. 
 
According to human capital theory earnings vary across individuals because of differences in 
individual investments in human capital endowments (skills, qualification, experience etc.). In 
this paradigm women earn less than men because they possess less experience, less 
qualifications etc.  The question thus arises as to why women are less well endowed with 
productivity generating characteristics than men. According to neo-classical theory it reflects 
individual choice.  Women who anticipate leaving the workforce for child rearing purposes may 
choose to acquire less skills than men, particularly where the costs of skills acquisition is high 
and the time to recoup the benefits of the investment are low (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). 
 
Changes in societal norms regarding working mothers may, therefore, be expected to affect 
female human capital investment decisions.  In this way women may be acquiring more skills 
and experience relative to males, thus raising their relative earnings and reducing the gender 
wage gap.  Empirical evidence for Australia indeed shows that this has been a factor in 
assisting gender wage convergence over the 1980s (e.g. Preston, 1997; and Kidd and Meng, 
1997). 
 
Legislation designed to promote equal employment opportunity (e.g. the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act 1986) 
may also be expected to facilitate gender earnings convergence. If women have better access 
to promotional and training opportunities then their incentive to investment in human capital will 
improve, resulting in higher earnings and a lower wage gap. Available evidence, however, 
suggests that these two acts have only had a minimal effect on the size of the wage gap in 
Australia (Kidd and Meng, 1997).  The main factor contributing to the convergence in gender 
earnings has been the removal of institutionalised wage discrimination in the equal pay 
decisions of 1969 and 1972 (Miller, 1994; Gregory and Duncan, 1981; Mitchell, 1983). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
obligations under the agreement; no party to the agreement was persuaded by threats or intimidation to enter into 
it; and each party genuinely wishes to have the agreement registered (Section 30(1)).  Where an agreement was 
likely to result in a wage rate substantially lower than that in the award the Commissioner of Workplace 
Agreements would request additional information on the agreement, the negotiation process etc. 
3  An analysis of agreements lodged between August 1994 and March 1996 (covering 577 employers and 
14,511 individuals) reveals that wage increases have been awarded in 83.05 per cent of cases, but a common 
feature of the agreements is an increase in hours of work (50.54%), and the  elimination of: penalty rates 
(54.33%); overtime rates (40.49%); and annual leave loading (67.07%) (Commissioner for Workplace Agreements, 
Annual Report, 1996). 




The rapid decline in the gender earnings differential following institutional intervention to 
change the wage structure is not a unique Australian phenomenon. Females in the UK 
similarly benefited from equal pay legislation introduced in the 1970s (Gregory, Daly and Ho, 
1986).  The US equal pay legislation had less of an impact, primarily because of the lack of 
supporting institutional structures (Gregory and Ho, 1985). The conclusion one may, therefore, 
draw is that institutions matter in the determination of female pay.5  Weakening them might 
thus be expected to slow or reverse the trend in gender earnings convergence. In the 
remainder of this paper we provide some empirical evidence in support of this proposition. 
 
 
IV Data and Methodology 
 
Data 
The data for this study are drawn from the 1991 and 1996 Census Household Sample Files 
(HSFs) which contain a one per cent sample of the population.  In keeping with most studies in 
this area our samples are restricted to full-time wage and salary earners aged between 16 and 
64 years.6 (Appendix A provides details on the data and variables used).  In the 1996 
Australian sample there are 26,370 males and 14,059 females.  Further restricting these 
samples to Western Australia results in samples sizes of 2592 and 1320 for males and 
females, respectively.  
 
Methodology 
Economic studies of the gender pay gap typically employ some variant of the decomposition 
procedure as proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).  The method requires the 
estimation of two separate wage equations of the form ln   Y Vim m im m= +β β0  and 
ln   Y Vif f if f= +β β0 .  The subscripts m and f denote males and females, respectively;  V is a 
vector of characteristics known to affect wages; and β  is a vector of estimated slope 
coefficients. On the assumption that the male wage structure represents the non-discriminatory 
norm, the raw wage gap can be decomposed as follows: 
 
ln ln ( )  (   ) (   )Y Y V V Vm f m f m f m f m f− = − + − + −β β β β β0 0     (1) 
 
 
where, V is a vector of the means of the independent variables. The first term of the 
decomposition calculates the portion of the gap attributable to differences in individual 
characteristics (e.g. qualifications and experience), and is often labeled the explained portion 
(or skill differential).  The second term calculates differences in returns to these characteristics, 
and is generally known as the unexplained portion.7  The third term represents differences in 
                                                           
5  For other references on this theme see Sayers (1998), Rubery (1992) and Whitehouse (1992). 
6  Full-timers are defined as those working 35 or more hours per week in their main job. Our rational for 
restricting the sample to full-time wage and salary earners is to overcome some of the estimation difficulties 
associated with measuring the labour market experience of persons employed part-time.   
7  If the female wage structure is taken as the non-discriminatory norm the explained portion is  equal to 
( ) V Vm f f− β , and the unexplained portion is equal to Vm m f(   )β β− . 
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the constants ( β 0 ).  Together the last two terms can be seen as providing an indicator of the 
extent of discrimination (Blinder, 1973) and/or data deficiencies. 
 
To investigate changes in the gender wage gap over time we use a procedure developed by 
Wellington (1993).  Wellington extends the Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition technique as follow: 
 













     (2) 
 
where the subscripts 96 and 91 refer, respectively, to the years 1996 and 1991.  The terms of 
the left-hand side measure the change in the raw wage gap over the period 1991 to 1996.  The 
first term on the right-hand side measures the portion of the change attributable to changes in 
the characteristics (e.g. experience and qualifications) of males and females over the period. 
(The decomposition method proposed values such changes at 1996 levels).    The second 
term on the right-hand side is, therefore, the residual. It measures the extent to which the 
change in the wage gap cannot be explained by changes in the characteristics of males and 
females. This evaluation holds the group’s 1991 characteristics constant.  The measured 
change is thus associated with wage structure effects. In other words, a change in the way 





Table 1, below, sets out the estimated coefficients associated with three separate regression 
models: Western Australian males; Western Australian females; and Australian females.   The 
results suggest the following.  Additional education is associated with additional earnings.  
Males completing a certificate qualification, for example, earn 13.5 per cent more than their 
unqualified counterparts.8 Relative to females not completing high school, certificate 
qualifications raise the earnings of WA females by 6.9 per cent and Australian females by 11.5 
per cent. An additional year of labour force experience raises WA male earnings by 2.75 per 
cent (evaluated after 10 years in the labour market); WA female earnings by 2.63 per cent; and 
Australian female earnings by 2.21 per cent. Working overtime is a significant determinant of 
earnings. WA males working overtime (defined as 41 or more hours per week) earn about 17.8 
per cent more than their male counterparts not working overtime.  The extra earnings 
advantage associated with overtime work for WA females and Australian females is equal to 
5.8 and 10.2 per cent, respectively.  Migrants in WA appear to perform equally as well as their 
Australian born counterparts.  At the national level, females born overseas have an earnings 
disadvantage of 6.2 per cent.  Marital status is not a significant determinant of female earnings, 
but it is of males. For WA men marriage is associated with a 10 per cent earnings advantage 
relative to those who have never married. By way of contrast, the presence of dependant 
children does not affect male earnings, but it does adversely impact on female earnings. 
Females in WA earn about 9 per cent less than women without dependant children. At the 
national level the earnings disadvantage associated with children is equal to 7 per cent. 
 
                                                           
8  In semi-logarithmic equations the coefficients of dummy variables which are small in value may be 
interpreted as the percentage effects on the dependent variable, relative to the omitted category (Halvorsen and 
Palmquist, 1980). 
8
The results also show that even after controlling for differences in human capital endowments, 
structural factors such as sector of employment, geographic location, industry and occupation 
of employment also impact on earnings.  Employment in the public sector is associated with 
higher earnings for all groups examined here.  Residing in a metropolitan location raises the 
relative earnings of females, but not males.  Industries paying relatively9 high weekly wages 
include Mining and Finance and Insurance. The relatively low paying industries are Retail 
Trade, Education, Health and Community Services and Agriculture.  The relatively10 high 
paying occupational groups are Managers and Professionals.  Males who are in managerial or 
professional occupations earn relatively more than Advanced Clerical Workers, while Labours 
and Related Workers earn significantly less. The same pattern is apparent for females too, 
although Tradespersons, Intermediate Clerical and Sales Workers, Production and Elementary 
Sales and Service Workers also earn significantly less than Advanced Clerical Workers. 
                                                           
9  The 'relative' comparison group is Wholesale Trade. 
10  The 'relative' comparison group is Advance Clerical and Service Workers. 
9
Table 1: Determinants of Earnings, WA males and females and Australian females, 1996.(a) 
 WA Males    WA Females             Australian Females 
 coeff.  mean coeff. mean coeff.  mean 
Constant 5.825 ** 5.766 ** 5.791 **  
Human Capital & Demographic     
hschool 0.052 ** 0.290 0.068 ** 0.358 0.061 ** 0.375 
cert 0.135 ** 0.319 0.069 ** 0.147 0.115 ** 0.142 
diploma 0.071  0.037 0.181 ** 0.068 0.197 ** 0.066 
degree 0.318 ** 0.166 0.287 ** 0.217 0.322 ** 0.238 
exp 0.037 ** 19.965 0.043 ** 18.159 0.033 ** 17.757 
exp2/100 -0.067 ** 5.315 -0.085 ** 4.623 -0.066 ** 4.496 
otime 0.178 ** 0.521 0.058 ** 0.308 0.102 ** 0.315 
esb -0.026  0.204 -0.022  0.186 0.018  0.099 
nesb -0.042  0.122 -0.059  0.113 -0.062 ** 0.144 
married 0.101 ** 0.584 -0.019  0.464 0.002  0.475 
wsd 0.065 ** 0.096 -0.044  0.174 0.017  0.147 
child 0.025  0.345 -0.086 ** 0.206 -0.069 ** 0.222 
Sector and Location     
govt 0.075 ** 0.184 0.074 ** 0.262 0.091 ** 0.253 
metro -0.012  0.729 0.070 ** 0.786 0.088 ** 0.724 
Industry     
affh -0.443 ** 0.034 -0.477 ** 0.021 -0.378 ** 0.017 
mining 0.407 ** 0.065 0.286 ** 0.024 0.247 ** 0.005 
manufact -0.043  0.179 0.078  0.064 -0.008  0.108 
elecgw 0.071  0.018 -0.011  0.002 0.078 ** 0.004 
constrn 0.017  0.108 0.116  0.017 -0.048  0.013 
rt -0.165 ** 0.100 -0.110 ** 0.116 -0.125 ** 0.109 
rest -0.190 ** 0.024 -0.072  0.054 -0.135 ** 0.039 
transtre 0.046  0.060 -0.029  0.027 0.041 ** 0.030 
communic 0.033  0.023 0.039  0.015 0.078 ** 0.019 
fin 0.136 ** 0.029 0.085  0.071 0.093 ** 0.072 
pbs 0.030  0.096 0.018  0.117 0.022  0.121 
pad -0.078  0.045 0.059  0.051 0.017  0.060 
ed -0.152 ** 0.056 -0.174 ** 0.126 -0.147 ** 0.119 
hellwel -0.118 ** 0.039 -0.146 ** 0.177 -0.121 ** 0.164 
ent -0.024  0.013 0.003  0.022 -0.033  0.024 
pos -0.134 ** 0.029 -0.071  0.042 -0.112 ** 0.040 
Occupation     
mgr 0.214 ** 0.147 0.144 ** 0.077 0.225 ** 0.078 
prof 0.203 ** 0.120 0.176 ** 0.216 0.168 ** 0.244 
aspro 0.084  0.138 -0.012  0.146 0.034 ** 0.129 
trade -0.038  0.230 -0.220 ** 0.033 -0.216 ** 0.031 
icssw 0.023  0.097 -0.142 ** 0.262 -0.086 ** 0.254 
iptw -0.043  0.143 -0.150  0.024 -0.204 ** 0.033 
ecssw -0.081  0.028 -0.164 ** 0.078 -0.121 ** 0.073 
lrw -0.148 ** 0.087 -0.257 ** 0.066 -0.206 ** 0.062 
       
Mean lnY   6.495 6.234   6.267 
Adj R2 0.434  0.410 0.393   
n   2592 1320   14059 
Notes: (a) See the appendix for a definition/explanation of the variables and reference categories; (b) the models 
are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  In all of the above models heteroskedasticity has been 




Using the information provided in Table 1 we examine why females in WA earn less than their 
State male counterparts. Is it because they are less qualified or have less experience?  Table 
2 presents the results using the Blinder/Oaxaca method previously discussed.  The results 
show that there is a raw wage gap of 26.1 percentage points between WA males and females. 
Of this 26.1 percentage point gap, 2.2 percentage points could be attributed to the superior 
human capital endowments of males. A further 3.8 percentage points reflected the greater 
incidence of overtime work, and 4.2 percentage points was due to the more favourable 
industrial distribution of males as compared to females.  As with other studies in this area (e.g. 
Chapman and Mulvey, 1985; Kidd, 1993; Preston, 1997) we find that the occupational 
structure of WA females helped to reduce the gender wage gap. Overall we found that 32.7 
per cent (or 8.5 percentage points) of the gap could be explained by the different productivity 
characteristics of males and females in the State.  After taking these factors into account the 
gap fell to 17.6 percentage points (column (iv)), translating to a female/male earnings ratio of 
82.4 per cent (column (vi)). 
 
Table 2: Decomposing the WA Gender Wage Gap, 1996. 








 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Human Capital 0.022 8.3    
Demographic 0.010 3.7    
Overtime  0.038 14.5    
Metro  0.001 0.3    
Govt.  -0.006 -2.3    
Industry  0.042 16.0    
Occupation -0.020 -7.8    
Total 0.261 0.085 32.7 0.176 67.3 0.824 
Source: Regression results reported in Table 1 
 
 
Using the Wellington technique previously described we examine why the gender wage gap in 
Western Australia has grown since 1991. From a human capital perspective the widening may 
reflect changes in the relative productivity endowments of males and females. If males, for 
example, have invested more in upgrading their skills and qualifications than females, then this 
would contribute towards a widening of the gap. Table 3 presents the results.  The focus is on 
the Perth metropolitan area as ABS Census coding arrangements make it impossible to 
separately identify Western Australia in the 1991 Census HSF.   
 
The results show that over the period 1991 to 1996 the gender wage gap in Perth increased by 
1.1 percentage point.11 The change may be entirely attributed to wage structure effects (see 
column (iii)).  That is, it arises as a result of changes in the market valuation of male and 
female characteristics (with male characteristics being treated more favourably). Females have 
                                                           
11  In 1991 the raw wage gap in Perth was equal to 22.4 per cent.  By 1996 it was equal to 23.5 per cent.  
ABS statistics (cat. 6302) show that over the same period (August 1991 to August 1996) the WA gender wage gap 
fell from 82.5 to 78.2 per cent (a 4.3 percentage point decline).  The 1.1 percentage point decline recorded using 
the Census data differs from ABS data for two reasons: firstly the focus is on Perth, not Western Australia. 
Secondly, the WA earnings data include earnings from all sources, and the data are grouped.  What the 1.1 
percentage point decline does show is that the trend observed in ABS catalogue 6302 is also borne out in the 
Census data (even though the magnitude in the latter is much smaller).   
11
improved their relative human capital endowments and in the absence of any other change this 
would have caused the gender wage gap to narrow by one percentage point. The results here 
are thus consistent with those uncovered elsewhere. Blau and Kahn (1994), for example, show 
that in the US women have upgraded their human capital skills, but adverse trends in the wage 
structure there have also caused the gender wage gap to widen. 
 
Table 3: The Gender Wage Gap, 1991 to 1996, Perth, Western Australia. 
 1991 to 1996 
Gap to be explained 
Change due 
characteristics 
Change due coefficients 
(market valuation) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Human capital  -0.010 -0.006 
Demographics -0.003 0.056 
Overtime  0.012 0.033 
Sector  -0.004 0.020 
Industry  0.009 0.029 
Occupation  -0.005 -0.026 
Constants   -0.093 
TOTAL 0.011 -0.001 0.012 
Source: 1991 and 1996 Census Data. 
 
 
The above results are, therefore, consistent with the proposition that institutions matter in the 
determination of female pay.12 The weakening of the institutional arrangements for pay 
determination in Western Australia has been accompanied by a growth in the gender wage 





Measuring Gender Wage Discrimination in Western Australia 
 
To lend further support to our argument above (namely, that the adverse shifts in the gender 
pay gap are the product of institutional rather than human capital forces) we utilise a 
methodology previously employed by Gregory and Daly (1990). 
 
Gregory and Daly focus on the gap in the relative earnings of males and females in the US and 
Australia. In 1981 the gap was equal to 37 per cent in the US and 23 per cent in Australia; a 14 
percentage point differential. Why the difference? The characteristics of the workforce in the 
two countries were similar, leading Gregory and Daly to hypothesise that the differentials were 
institutional.  To examine this hypothesis they estimated male and female wage equations for 
the US and Australia and then asked the question: what would the gender wage gap be in the 
US if males and females in that country were paid according to the Australian wage structure?  
Substitution of the Australian coefficients for the US coefficients revealed that the gender wage 
gap in the US would fall 13 percentage points (from 37 per cent to 24 per cent), almost entirely 
eliminating the US/Australia observed differential. The results thus confirmed their hypothesis 
that the gap was the product of different institutional environments for pay determination. 
 
                                                           
12  Additional support for this conclusion may be found in Reiman (1998).  Reiman examines the gender 
wage gap using data from the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS95). He finds that 
the gender wage gap in the 'bargaining stream' is larger than that of the 'non-bargaining stream'. 
12
Using a similar procedure we ask the question: what would the gender wage gap be in 
Western Australia if females in that state were to be paid according to the national female 
wage structure?  In other words, rather than allowing Western Australia to value characteristics 
such as overtime work differently,13 we impose the national rates. Having done that we 
recalculate the gender wage gap in Western Australia.  The difference between this 
hypothetical gap (using the national pay structure) and the observed wage gap (when the 
actual WA pay structure is employed) gives us a measure of the extent to which females in 
Western Australia are disadvantaged by prevailing institutional arrangements for pay 
determination.14 Table 4 presents the results. 
 
Table 4: Hypothetical and Actual Gender Wage Gap, WA, 1996. 
 Raw Wage 
Gap 








 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Actual  0.261 0.085 32.7 0.176 67.3 0.824 
Hypothetical 0.191 0.046 24.1 0.145 75.9 0.855 
Notes: The first row is taken from Table 2. The second row is calculated after the female coefficients have been 
switched. 
 
The results show that the adoption of the national female wage structure in Western Australia 
would deliver an adjusted earnings gap of 14.5 percentage points (column (iv)); 3.1 
percentage points lower than the actual WA gender wage gap. Put into perspective, this 
shows that females in Western Australia earn around $20.5 per week less than their 
counterparts nationally simply because of their geographic location.15 
 
 
VI Summary and Conclusion 
 
Since 1991 governments throughout Australia have pursued labour market deregulation in an 
effort to increase labour market flexibility and, in turn, workplace productivity and 
competitiveness. Further deregulatory reforms are currently before the Federal Parliament in 
the form of the Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999. 
Thus far the various state and federal industrial reforms have had no significant impact on 
national female/male relative pay outcomes. However, the evidence from Western Australia 
shows that where radical industrial relations reform has been pursued there has been a 
significant widening of the gender pay gap. One might, therefore, infer from this research that, 
nationally, the worse may be still to come - particularly if the Bill before parliament is passed in 
its current form. 
                                                           
13  Table 1 shows that the rate of return associated with overtime work is equal to 5.8 per cent for WA 
females and 10.2 per cent for females nationally. 
14  We noted  earlier that the unadjusted wage gap may be decomposed into an explained and an 
unexplained component.  The later may be taken as an indicator of the extent of discrimination and/or data 
deficiencies (e.g. poor measures of experience).  However, in comparing the Western Australian female wage 
structure with the national female wage structure we overcome the 'data deficiency' problem since there is no 
reason to believe that the degree of bias imparted into the female coefficients differs between these two groups.  
The implication of this is that the residual thus measures discrimination and not also data deficiencies. 
15  The calculation is based on full-time female (national) ordinary time earnings at November 1998, equal 
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child=1 if person has dependant children. 
degree=completed a degree. 
diploma=completed diploma 
esb=migrants born in an English speaking country. 
exp= potential labour market experience. 
govt=1 for persons employed in the government sector. 
hschool=highest level of education attained was Year 12. 
married=1 for married individuals. 
metro=1 if the person resides in a major urban or migratory area. 
nesb=migrants born in a non-English speaking country.  
otime=works 41 or more hours per week. 
wsd=1 for individuals who were either widowed, separated or divorced at the time of the Census. 
 
Industry, 1 digit (ANZSIC) 
affh=Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. 
mining=Mining 
manufact=Manufacturingt 
elecgw=Electricity, Gas and Water. 
constrn=Construction. 
wt=Wholesale Trade (reference group) 
rt=Retail Trade. 
transtre=Transport and Storage. 
communic=Communication Services. 
fin=Finance and Insurance 
pbs=Property and Business Services. 
pad=Public Administration and Defence. 
ed=Education. 
hellwel=Health and Welfare 
ent=Entertainment and Recreation Services. 
pos=Personal and Other Community Services.  
 
Occupation, 1 digit (ASCO 2nd) 




acsw= Advanced Clerical and Service Workers (reference group) 
icssw=Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Workers 
iptw=Intermediate Plant Operators 
lrw=Labourers and Related Workers. 
 
 
 
